IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GYPSIE JONES,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

V.

TACO BELL CORP.,

Defendant.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendant's motion, but instead moved to stay the action.¹ Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion to stay and moves for the imposition of sanctions. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion to stay is denied, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and Defendant's motion for sanctions is denied.

On the day Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment was due, Plaintiff filed a request for a continuance of Defendant's motion and a counter-motion for a stay. In the request for continuance and counter-motion to stay, Plaintiff asserts that she "opposes [Defendant's] motion," and requests that "if the court is disinclined to continue the hearing date, she [be given] a 48-hour extension (from the moment the court issues its order denying her continuance) to file her opposition." Although Plaintiff asserts she opposes the motion, she did not timely file an opposition as required by Local Rule 78-230(c).

#### **DISCUSSION**

# I. Motion to Stay

Plaintiff asserts that her motion to stay this action should be granted since a pending class action, which was filed before the instant action was commenced, "share[s] identical issues and parties" with the instant action. (Pl.'s Mot. for Stay at 7.) However, Plaintiff's stay motion is untimely in light of the litigation that has occurred in the instant action and since it only appears to be made in response to Defendant's summary judgment motion. Therefore, it is denied.

# II. Motion for Summary Judgment

#### A. ADA Claims

Plaintiff alleges several violations of the ADA

Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAG") in Defendant's Taco Bell Restaurant

#3007 ("Restaurant"). Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing
that there is no genuine issue of material fact on any of Plaintiff's
claims for injunctive relief under the ADA. For the following
reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA
claims is granted.

- 1. Plaintiff alleges that the tow away sign outside the Restaurant is the wrong color. (Compl.: Preliminary Site Accessibility Report ("AR")  $\P$  2.) However, the ADAAG does not require tow away signs. (Id.; see ADAAG 4.6.)
- 2. Plaintiff alleges that there are no exterior route of travel signs. (AR  $\P$  8.) However, no such signs are required at the Restaurant "because there is no deviation from the route of way for the general public." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 8; see ADAAG 4.1.)

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- 3. Plaintiff alleges that there is "[n]o directional signage to the restroom." (AR ¶ 17.) However, the ADAAG only requires signage when "not all [restrooms] are accessible." (ADAAG 4.1.2(7)(d),)
- 4. Relying on ADAAG 4.4.1, Plaintiff alleges that the "[t]oilet tissue dispenser [in the restroom] protrudes more than 4 inches from [the] wall." (AR  $\P$  25.) However, Defendant avers that the dispenser is below 27" and therefore is not covered by rule 4.4.1. (Blackseth Decl. at ¶ 6.)
- 5. Plaintiff alleges that the "[t]oilet tissue dispenser is 3 inches in front of the water closet not [the] required 12 inches in front." (AR  $\P$  22.) However, Defendant correctly notes that the ADAAG only requires that the dispenser be "installed within reach." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 9; ADAAG 4.16.)
- Plaintiff alleges that the condiment counter fails to comply with the ADAAG because it lacks a section that is 36" by 24" and is 34" high. (AR  $\P$  10.) However, Plaintiff cites no ADAAG section supporting this allegation. (See id.) Furthermore, ADAAG 5.6 requires "Self-service shelves and dispensing devices for tableware, dishware, condiments, food and beverages [to] be installed to comply with 4.2." ADAAG 4.2 specifies reach heights between 15" and 48" for forward reach and 9" and 54" for side reach. Plaintiff does not allege that the condiment counter fails to comply with these requirements.
- Plaintiff alleges that the "[t]ow away sign has no phone number"; the accessible parking signage lacks the required "separate van accessible sign"; there is "[n]o accessible parking signage at one space"; the accessible aisle is not painted with a "no parking" sign;

the "[e]ntrance door has no [International Symbol of Accessibility]"; the "[d]ining room booths do not have 30 inches between cushions"; the "[d]ining room seating does not offer 19 inches before an obstruction"; and the "[p]atio seating does not offer 19 inches before an obstruction." (AR ¶¶ 1, 3-5, 9, 11-12, 15.) Defendant avers that all of these conditions have been fixed or are otherwise in compliance. (Def.'s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("SUF") at ¶¶ 10-14, 17, 19-20.)

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Plaintiff also alleges that the following violations are present in the Restaurant's restroom: 2 the "[s]tall door [is] not self closing"; the "[o]utside stall door does not have [an] accessible handle"; the "[i]nside stall door does not have [an] accessible handle"; the "[c]learance for [the strike side] area on [the] interior doors is not 18 inches on the pull side and 12 inches on the push side"; the "[t]oilet tissue dispenser['s] leading edge is 44 inches from [the] back wall, not 36 inches maximum"; the "[t]oilet tissue dispenser [is] not mounted below [the] grab bar"; the "[c]enter of [the] lavatory [is] 9 inches from wall not 18 inch minimum"; the "[d]rainpipes under [the] lavatory [are] 9 inches from the wall not 6 inch maximum"; the "[h]ot water and drainpipes are not insulated"; there is "[n]ot a 30 by 48 inch minimum clear space in front of [the] lavatory"; and the "[s]tall door is an obstruction to [the] lavatory and soap dispenser." (AR ¶¶ 18-21, 23-24, 26-30.) However, Defendant avers that all of these conditions have been fixed or are otherwise in compliance with the ADAAG. (SUF  $\P\P$  25-27, 29-30, 34-37.)

Plaintiff does not specify which restroom she complains does not comply with the ADAAG. However, it is assumed that Plaintiff's allegations concern the women's restroom since Plaintiff is a woman. (SUF  $\P$  5.)

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For the stated reasons, Defendant's summary judgment motion on Plaintiff's ADA claims is granted.

#### B. State Law Claims

Since all of the claims over which original jurisdiction was exercised have been resolved, the issue whether jurisdiction should continue being exercised over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims is decided because exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-173 (1997); Mendoza v. Zirkel Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1174 (9th Cir. 2002). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim where "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . " 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). "[W]hen deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 173 (internal citations omitted). "[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Carnegie-Mellon to supplemental jurisdiction). "Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law." United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). In this action, application of these values favors dismissal of Plaintiff's remaining

state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Therefore, Plaintiff's state claims are dismissed as of the date on which this Order is filed.

III. Motion for Sanctions

Defendant moves for the imposition of sanctions "under the Court's inherent powers and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16." (Def.'s Notice of Mot. for Sanctions at 1.) Defendant has not shown that sanctions are warranted under Rule 16(f). Furthermore, Defendant has not shown the need for the use of inherent authority since 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides the explicit authority applicable to the alleged conduct at issue. Therefore, Defendant's motion for sanctions is denied.

### CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's motion to stay is denied, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA claims is granted, and Defendant's motion for sanctions is denied. Further, Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed as of the date on which this Order is filed. Therefore, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 14, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr. GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. United States District Judge

## Main Identity

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#### **Docket Text:**

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell Jr. on 6/14/05 ORDERING that Pltf's Motion to Stay is DENIED, Deft's [24] Motion for Summary Judgment on Pltf's ADA Calims is GRANTED, Deft's Motion for Sanctions is DENIED and Pltf's state law claims are DISMISSED. The Clerk will enter JUDGEMENT in FAVOR OF DEFENDANT. CASE CLOSED.(Sherman, T)

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